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ARE RIGHTS THE RIGHT THING?
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, COMMUNITARIAN
PURPOSES AND AMERICA'S PROBLEMS
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

by

Mary Ann Glendon. New York: Free Press, 1991, Pp. xvi, 218.
$22.95.
Reviewed by David Abraham*
[T]he so-called rights of man .

.

. are simply the rights ...

of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from
the community. The most radical [liberal] constitution, that of
1793 [identifies] the natural and imprescriptible rights [as]:
equality, liberty, security, property.
What constitutes liberty?
Liberty is . . . the right to do everything which does not
harm others. . . . It is a question of the liberty of man re-

garded as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself. . liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man
from man. It is the right of such separation ...
The practical application of the right of liberty is the
right of private property. What constitutes the right of private
property?
The right of property is

. .

. the right to enjoy one's for-

tune and dispose of it as one will; without regard for others
and independently of society. It is the right of self-interest.
This individual liberty, and its application, form the basis of
civil society. It leads every man to see in other men, not the
realization, but rather the limitation of his own liberty.
* Associate Professor of Law at the University or Miami and currently a Fellow at the Davis
Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University. Thanks to Josh Cohen. Gary Gerstle.
Jennifer Hochschild, and Rob Rosen for their philosophical, historical, political-theoretical, and
legal insights and suggestions. For research assistance, thanks to Paul Feitman.
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The term "equality" has no political significance. It is
only the right to liberty as defined above; namely that every
man is equally regarded as a self-sufficient monad ...
And security?

. .

. Security is the supreme social concept

of civil society; the concept of the police ...
The concept of security is not enough to raise civil society
above its egoism. Security is, rather, the assurance of its
egoism.
None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond
egoistic man, man as he is as a member of civil society; that is
an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into
himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. .

.

. [S]pecies-life

itself-society-appears as a system which is external to the
individual and as a limitation of his original independence.
The only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons.1

A

S even Marx conceded, rights are strong things. As we, Americans in particular, know them, rights are meant to stop other people, popular majorities, and especially governments, in their tracks.
Rights, or at least rights as conventionally understood and classically
articulated in our Bill of Rights, are essentially prepolitical, grounded
in the individual and his various forms of property. These rights are
meant to guarantee a zone of autonomy for self-fulfillment. The English, American, and, to a lesser extent, French revolutionaries for the
most part saw rights as held by individuals and intended to ward off
despotism, majority coercion, and transient fashion or sentiment. We
all value these liberties as a part of the liberal inheritance which fosters
individuality and personality.
But, as practical socialist critics from Babeuf and Marx to DuBois
and Allende have repeatedly insisted, "rights" are also very bourgeois.
They presume a material basis (productive property) which most people do not have; they posit false universals (as if we were all situated
alike and equally interested in the same things); they assume a false
equality through their contract orientation (as if freedom of speech, or
freedom of labor, or freedom of contract, meant the same thing to a
1. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, reprinted in
(T.B. Bottomore ed., 1964).

KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS

24-26
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newspaper as to its employees); they foster absolute and polarizing oppositions which inevitably clash (e.g., the right of the unborn versus the
right of a woman to choose). Thus, in their pristine form, and in their
American elaboration, rights are the sinews of property-based bourgeois individualism. 2 Since the nineteenth century, rights have underpinned liberal society's economic and social deregulation. What is the
market about, if not affording individuals the opportunity to choose?
What is having rights about, if not being free to choose?
"The People" may have many rights, but nevertheless remain powerless. Citizens have elaborated their civil liberties, but have only sporadically won social reform. For two centuries now, one response from
the left has been simply to redirect the energies of those interested in
social change into other channels, away from talk of rights and towards
mass politics. Such mass politics has been predicated on notions of class
struggle, which include gaining control of state institutions through
majoritarian (electoral) politics aimed at abolishing, or at least weakening, private ownership and control of the economy.
The left has also responded by attempting to move from political
rights to social rights, i.e., from individual, procedural, boundarymarking, negative liberties to collective, material, participation-based,
positive liberties. The hope on the left has been that social democracy
would create certain social rights just as bourgeois democracy had created certain political rights. This approach has been somewhat successful, especially in Europe, where social rights have been won by mass
movements organized at the workplace, in residential neighborhoods, in
the streets, and at the ballot box.
In the United States, courts have often played a greater role than
politics in the establishment of social rights, especially in recent decades. These same courts have been crucially responsible for the fact
that we have a very free country-in the negative rights sense. Nowhere else have economic and social deregulation triumphed so fully: in
America both markets and morality are privatized. In the negative
rights sense, we may be the freest of all peoples. Nowhere is the free
market treated with more reverence; nowhere are procedural safeguards against public power so strong; nowhere are social norms less
binding on individuals who seek to choose their own way. We seem
unencumbered by any Burkean partnership of the living with the al2. This is a key argument in the excellent book on the founders and their legacy by JENNIFER
NEDELSKY. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITs OF AMERICAN CONSTITmTONALIsM; THE MADIS-

ONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990).
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ready dead and the yet unborn. Not coincidentally, almost nowhere are
mass movements weaker. America is indeed the land of liberty: the
land of capitalism and of the ACLU; a magnet to immigrants seeking
freedom.
Struggles on behalf of the subaltern lave taken place and continue
to take place in the United States within this framework of rights. Notable successes have been achieved. Over the last two generations especially; liberals and the left have worked to gain rights in and through
the courts on the basis of what lawyers, rights advocates, and judges
call "fundamental rights" and "due process." Reasons for this focus on
the courts are simple. The left's electoral weakness has produced few
successes in the legislative arena and even fewer in the executive-administrative domain. At the same time, for a number of historically
contingent reasons, the most recent being the mass movement of African Americans in the '50s and '60s, American courts were unusually
sympathetic to certain claims from the left and minorities for nearly a
generation. But, with the exception of a few law professors, everyone
seems to know by now that the Warren Court period was anomalous
and is now over.
Yet America, despite its admired status as a land of rights, is in
dire straits. Rights alone do not make a good society. The symptoms of
decay and difficulty are legion and clear in every area of life. The decline in our real standard of living continues into its third decade;3 inequality of wealth is greater than at any time since the 1920s; 4 the number of children living below the poverty line has grown by thirty
percent since 1970;5 basic literacy cannot be expected of our high
school graduates; there are more minority men age seventeen to
twenty-five in prisons than in colleges; 6 sociopaths outnumber strollers
3. See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT

OF THE PRESIDENT,

tbl. B-45, at 299 (Feb. 1988). The trend

has continued. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: FurtherReflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1.
4. See, e.g., Sylvia Nasar, The Rich Get Richer, But Never the Same Way Twice, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1992, at E3; Carole Shammas, A New Look at Long-Term Trends in Wealth Inequality
in the United States, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 412 (1993); Edward N. Wolff & Marcia Marley, LongTerm Trends in U.S. Wealth Inequality: Methodological Issues and Results, in THE MEASUREMENT OF SAVING. INVESTMENT. AND WEALTH 765, 765 (Robert E. Lipsey & Helen S. Tice eds.,
1989).

5. See, e.g., James Laxer, Elite Swept Problems Under the Rug, TORONTO STAR, May 5,
1992, at A19.
6. See. e.g., MARC MAUER, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM

(1990); Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics, 78 GEO.

L.J. 1929, 1930 n. 1 (1990). See also Stefanie Asin, Governor, Lanier Talk to NAACP; Richards
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on many of our streets; our infant and black male mortality rates both
compare unfavorably with those of much of the third world;7 and the
elderly of our nation are more concerned with the costs of illness than
with fear of the Beyond. Though our dependable external enemies have
disappeared, internal tensions of all sorts have risen to a level that
makes nearly every mundane conversation on our sidewalks, in our
schools and at our workplaces a diplomatic exercise. 8
Where is the left, the historic advocate of universal rights, and
what is it doing about this state of affairs? Even the most promising of
rights realized by litigation activists since the 1950s have come to seem
ineffective. With few exceptions, the left has proven unable even to address the immiserization of American life, let alone signal a way out.
The splendid and powerful political-cultural "quilt," foreseen in Jesse
Jackson's speech at the 1984 Democratic convention, has simply failed
to materialize.
Instead, the left has helped fashion the would-be peuple of
America into competing, if not warring, identitoids, discursive and biological communities who fight with each other over pride of place and
respective shares of a shrinking pie. Thus, instead of having to contend
with a solidaristic rainbow coalition of working-class Americans and
their allies, the free-market devotees, the business elite, and their allies
easily run the country, ignoring completely the babel from ivory tower
soi-disant radicalism. While we work on our particularity, demand absolute rights, and nurture our separate grievances, the Invisible Hand
and those who control it tighten their grip on the c:untry.
In this dreary scene, dissatisfaction with the "rights model" of liberal society has been growing on the left and on the right. For the
right, such dissatisfaction has proven a marketable political commodity,
trumpeted by conservative Vice Presidents and Attorneys General from
Issues Call for Change, HousToN CHRON., Oct. 31, 1992, at A31 (according to Texas governor

speaking to NAACP, four times as many black men are in prison as in college); Paris, Yo! A
Rapper's Domestic Policy Plan, WASH. PosT, Jan. 3, 1993, at C2 (editorial stating that there are
over 600,000 minority men in prison and 435,000 in college), Camile Peri, Boys to Men, LA
TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1992, (Magazine), at 38 (stating nearly one-quarter of college-age black men are
in jail, on probation, or parole).
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Goldberg, Curing an Ailing Health Department. New Boss Unfazed by
Challenge, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 1991, at 21; Laurence J. O'Connell, Values and Health Care
Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 18, 1992, at C23.

8. On some problems in everyday sociability see, for example, GERALD GRAr. THF CULTURE
WARS (1992); DAVID BROMWICH. POLTICS BY OTHER MEANS (1992); David A. Hollinger. How
Wide the Circle of the "We"? American Intellectuals and the Problem of the Ethnos Since World
War II, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 317 (1993).
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Spiro Agnew and John Mitchell to Dan Quayle and Ed Meese or
Richard Thornburgh. Now it seems to be growing in the center as well.
On virtually the same day last May that Dan Quayle assailed Murphy
Brown's right to eschew the father and bear a child out of wedlock as a
lifestyle choice, a group of self-styled "Communitarians" held a teachin in New York at which, among other matters, the virtues of responsible, conventional, and conforming two-parent families were lauded,
Mary Ann Glendon, a Professor of Law at Harvard, is a central
figure among these Communitarians and an editor of their journal, The
Responsive Community, subtitled "Rights and Responsibilities." And
now she has authored a book, Rights Talk,9 that examines the origins
and consequences of a peculiarly American rights malaise.
If nothing else, the title of Glendon's book is directly on the mark.
Trapped in a battle for rights, the dominant strand of social activism in
America has failed to transcend regnant American liberalism and the
inequalities lying at its heart and in its soul. Does Glendon's suspiciously Burkean voice have something to tell us about our predicament? It certainly does. A combination of legal-political and intellectual history, Rights Talk demands our attention, for the hour is getting
late in America. Glendon's analysis is on the mark in ways most on the
left and right cannot or refuse to see, and her implicit prescriptions
must be taken seriously as well.
Under better circumstances, one could simply debate the relative
merits of Rawlsian liberalism and Sandelian communitarianism ° and
debate the need to balance self-fulfillment and unencumbered individuals with collective obligation and situated identities. Under better circumstances, Rights Talk would be like one of those criticisms of capitalist society voiced now and then over the past century and a half by
the papacy: it condemns what we know to be wrong about marketbased, individualistic, liberal, capitalist societies without necessarily
9.

MARY ANN GLENDON. RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

(1991).
10.

JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); MICHAEL SANDEL. LIBERALISM AND THE

LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critiqueof Liberalism, 18 POL.
THEORY 6 (1990). In an assessment that will surely stand for some time, Alan Ryan has written
that Rawls's book "has sparked off more argument among philosophers, and has been more widely
cited by sociologists, economists, judges, and politicians than any work of philosophy in the past
hundred years." ALAN RYAN. THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 101

(Quentin Skinner ed., 1986). Rawls' Kantian-individualist and process-oriented moral philosophy
has been the subject of so much work that an annotated bibliography might now run to a thousand pages. For an acid critique, see Fred Siegel, Is Archie Bunker Fit to Rule? Or: How Immanuel Kant Became One of the Founding Fathers,69 TELOS 9 (1986).
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convincing us that we would be better off under the less individualist
and selfish regime of "ordered liberty" offered up as an alternative by
critics of liberalism.
Given the current circumstances of both America and the left,
however, Glendon's book is more than just a foil or reminder. There is
much to learn here and some indication of what needs to be done. Not
only is Glendon accurate in claiming that America's preoccupation
with rights has gone too far, but she is on to something crucial when
she proposes a return to politics and community and a turn away from
rights (and courts) as means to overcome some of what ails America.
Glendon begins with a harsh and unsparing indictment of how
rights talk has contributed to the indisputable decrepitude of American
politics and public life. The "starkness and simplicity" of American
rights talk and the radical liberalism in which it is embedded, "its
prodigiality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities""1
have all done their share. With their multiplication, rights and the people claiming them clash more frequently and find compromise more
difficult. Our particular interests block out those of others and lead to
both a quashing of habits of the heart and a disdain for politics which
is, after all, about living with others.
Worse yet, rights campaigns produce negative synergy: every campaign for rights inevitably elicits claims of counter-rights so that potential social solidarity gives way to individual absolutism, group egotism,
and the disappearance of social obligation. Thus, the woman whose
abortion right is secured because her body is her property must absolutize such a right so that it may triumph over the competing right of a
fetus to life. 12 Indeed, in-vitro transfer technology will inevitably proceed to the point where an estranged father will sue to remove or retain
his share of the fetus off the property of the mother. While some left
legal scholars such as Morton Horwitz and Mark Tushnet have made
these and similar points about the rights syndrome,13 the bulk of the
11.

GLENDON,

supra note 9, at x.

12. Glendon rightly reminds us that the privacy right, which currently undergirds abortion
rights, emanates from the property right. Id. at 47-56. Without property there can be no privacy.
See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
the Law, 89 YALE Li. 421 (1980); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis. The Right to Privacy. 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
13. Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 393 (1988); Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). It is a distinct and unaccountable weakness of
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American left still stands with individual rights and the elaboration of
alternative choices.
For Glendon, the ideological root of our exaggerated rights culture
lies in our adoption of an unmitigated version of Locke's natural rights
myth, as embroidered by Blackstone. Although she does not furnish the
economic and social history that would account for it, Glendon correctly reminds us of the peculiar Anglo-American obeisance toward
property-the basis of bourgeois rights. Where, as in France or Germany, feudalism and the classic traditions made greater impressions
than they did in the United States, individualism and property did not
become as hegemonic.
Neither Rousseau, Savigny, Aquinas, nor Aristotle can underpin
the antistate, anticommunitarian vision of solitary individuals in a state
of nature such as is featured in the Hobbesian-Lockean myth. In their
attack on monarchy, the natural rights liberals also attacked natural
and community solidarities while banishing beliefs in care and dependency. 4 Unlike Americans, the continental European left, not so imprisoned by natural rights liberalism, has found it possible in this century to make headway in refeudalizing property and in insisting that
property is subject to stewardship, and is a public utility rather than an
absolute and inviolable right divorced from any responsibility to one or
more communities.
Glendon assumes, I believe correctly, that society is prior to and
has legitimate claims over individuals. The relationship between self
and society is constitutive, not merely instrumental. Such a view necessarily rejects radical individualism, with its own attendant rejection of
duties-an individualism that describes not only ACLU-style liberals
but also liberal free-marketeers and the postmodern radicals, themselves in fact hyper-liberals, who dominate what remains of the AmeriGlendon's volume that-although she credits Marx with unmasking liberal-bourgeois rights as
ignoring human sociality and materiality-she virtually ignores the existence of recent left schol-

arship on many of the issues she examines. See, e.g., Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights, 62 TEx.
L. REV. 1541 (1984).

It is true, of course, that responsibilities, duties, and obligations, which play so great a role
for Glendon and communitarians generally, are often short-shrifted in left scholarship. Hence, in

her full and excellent discussion of Blackstone, for example, Glendon makes no reference to the
very pertinent work of her own colleagues: Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979) and ROBERTO UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS

(1975). Even more to the point, Glendon ignores left scholarship on "reliance interests," a potentially strong communitarian argument in areas she herself addresses, like factory plant closings.
See Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
14. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 43.
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can left in the universities.1 5
Glendon's critique of the "illusion of absoluteness" 10 underlying
our model of rights causes her to miss the grandeur of documents like
the Bill of Rights, whose popularity with people the world over cannot
be gainsaid. At the same time, one cannot quarrel with her assertion
that the American version shows a
penchant for absolute, extravagant formulations . .. nearaphasia concerning responsibility. . excessive homage to individual independence and self-sufficiency .. .habitual concentration on the individual and the state at the expense of the
intermediate groups of civil society ... and unapologetic
insularity."7
The absoluteness of our rights awakens infinite and impossible desires,
thereby increasing conflicts and lessening the chance for dialogue and
community consensus.
Like Marx, Glendon finds that there is much libert and much
egalitg in our regime but little fraternitg. For the Communitarians, the
development of the much-vaunted privacy right is a product of illusory
conceptions of human self-sufficiency, which Glendon, like many
others, blames on John Stuart Mill. Here Glendon is somewhat unfair.
"I have the right to be left alone and to do whatever I want so long as
it doesn't hurt anybody else" is a position that Mill himself left behind
after recognizing its inadequacy-in part through his contact, via
Harriet Taylor, with socialism and feminism.
Still, Glendon is perfectly correct to argue that "privacy
rights"-including the rights to contraception and abortion that we
have derived from privacy-were by sleight "pulled from the hat of
property" and that those who own no castle can never expect to benefit
from the many rights ownership conveys.1 8 Unlike human dignity or
personality, property is only mythically universal, and the propertybased, life-style liberties fostering individuality are indeed often antidemocratic and inegalitarian as well as isolating. Thus, by liberal
15. See. e.g., ELIZABETH Fox-GENovEsF FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIO.& A CRITIQUE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1991); Feminist Rights, Individualist Wrongs, 7 TirK N, May/June 1992, at
21. In some circles, Fox-Genovese's broad-ranging and incisive book, which reveals the hyper-

liberalism of much current radicalism, has been treated as treasonous or heretical. See. e.g.. Ellen
DuBois, Feminism Without Illusions, 254 TIE NATION 57 (1992) (book review).

16. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 43.
17.

Id. at 14.

18.

GLENDON,

supra note 9, at 51.
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logic a woman's pregnancy or abortion is her prerogative and hers
alone; but it is also her problem and hers alone.
Just as Rousseau, Hegel, and Humboldt tempered Hobbes, Locke,
and Coke, so Marxist socialism and Christian democracy have tempered liberal individualism in much of continental Europe. But not in
the United States, where "don't tread on me" remains a declaration of
freedom. Our emphasis on individual autonomy-choice-makes collective action, whether as a family, a neighborhood, or a trade union,
much more difficult than in Europe. We fear, disdain, and avoid the
dependency that is intertwined with collective action; partially as a result, we have less of it than most European societies.
There is little significant difference between current Republican,
free-market individualism and Democratic constituency-individualism.
And, as Fox-Genovese showed, even the radicals among us often ignore
the social and dependent dimensions of life.' 9 Consequently, those located in situations of dependency-such as mothers, children, the old,
the sick, and the poor-as well as those who must take care of the
dependent are worse off in the United States than in any comparable
country. As Glendon rightly points out, European constitutions and the
new European Social Charter "domesticate the lone rights bearer by
situating him in social context" 20 and thereby force a greater recognition of the weak and dependent.
American law, according to Glendon, emphasizes the absence of
obligation to others. It is as if "we roam at large in a land of strangers,
where we presumptively have no obligations toward others except to
avoid the active infliction of harm. '21 As every law student is taught,
we have no legal duty to rescue a stranger unless we ourselves caused
the peril he faces. (According to the Supreme Court, sometimes even
our police and social workers are not so burdened.) 22 The logics of liberal individualism and bourgeois causation enshrined in our Constitution, being what they are, we cannot be made our brother's keeper.2
19. See Fox-GENOVESE, supra note 15, at 113-38.
20. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 74.
21. Id. at 77.
22. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989).
23. Glendon aptly quotes Judge-scholar Richard Posner in a police failure-to-rescue case:
[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. . . . The men
who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for
the people but that it might do too much to them. . . . [T]he difference between harming and failing to help is just the difference . . . between negative liberty-being let
alone by the state-and positive liberty-being helped by the state.
GLENDON, supra note 9, at 91 (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th
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As in other departments of life, what in much of Europe is considered a "civic duty" is perceived in the United States as a "private
right." For Glendon such language is important: the programmatic
rights and enabling, positive liberties embraced in many European constitutions are simply absent from our own. Space that might be public
is or remains private: duty yields to liberty. Because of our vaunted
right not to conform, and our readiness to separate law from morality,
our membership in society demands less of us and offers less to us.
Like Communitarians generally, Glendon wants a law more
closely linked to morality-but whose? Which community or religious
faith should provide the requisite ethical base-and to whom? Even so
comprehensive a sociology of religion as Max Weber undertook proved
unable to discover a universal ethical core that could infuse positive
ethics (as opposed to class prejudices) into formal rules. 24 For Glendon,
America errs too much on the side of moral skepticism over natural
law. Thus, our rights validate individual, arbitrary preferences rather
than teaching us truths or even community values. Glendon would like
to have the law carry some of the freight that community, religion, and
custom can no longer shoulder: in our society, "law is more pervasive
than any other common bond."25 Yet, as philosophers and judges have
repeatedly asserted, without a transcendent ethical base outside itself,
the law cannot do this and must remain agnostic.
Rights Talk operates at the margins of recent political-philosophical debates on liberalism and community rather than addressing them
head on,26 even in their more limited jurisprudential context. And,
more often than not, Rights Talk seeks to mend our provincial liberal
social order, not to challenge it fundamentally. Yet tinkering can
change much in life. Other countries-even other capitalist democracies-are different. Juxtaposed to America's Lockean constitutional
conception of individualistic, self-regarding, and unencumbered persons, Germany offers a constitutionalism more deeply implicating community and duty, one rooted in a history that has included significant
feudal and socialist impulses. Whereas the centrality and strength of
our negative liberties testify to our acute distrust of state power, the
Cir. 1983)). Glendon also observes that in recent decades even hallowed "family rights" have
come to be treated as only the rights of individuals in temporary alliance. Id. at 102, 130.
24. See, e.g., MAX WEBERt THE SOCIOLOGY OF REuGIONt(Ephraim lFischoff, trans 1963).
25. GLENDON, supra note 9, at 102.
26. For a useful introduction to this constellation of issues, see Stephen A. Gardbaum. Law.
Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MIcH. L REv. 685 (1992).
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current German constitution underscores the social connections and
commitments of individual citizens. As one German constitutional specialist has put it:
One [the American] vision is partial to the city perceived as a
private realm in which the individual ig alone, isolated, and in
competition with his fellows, while the other [current German] vision is partial to the city perceived as a public realm
where individual and community are bound together in some
degree of reciprocity. Thus, the authority of the community,
as represented by the state, finds a more27congenial abode in
German than American constitutionalism.
Crowning this hierarchy of legal values is something the German
jurists regularly call "the principle of human dignity."28 This principle
requires rejection of both legal positivism and moral relativism-the
very hallmarks of our own system of negative rights. One former President (Chief Justice) of the German Court has gone so far as to eschew
the safety of liberal positivism and relativism and say that the guiding
values of the German Basic Law are "equality, social justice, the welfare state, the rule of law, and militant democracy. "29
Article 20(1) of the 1949 Basic Law describes the Federal Republic as a federal, democratic, and social state. This social commitment
adds to the formal, procedural equality of negative rights law shared
with the American constitutional conception: in other words, justice is
commanded along with fairness. Equality transcends its purely formal
meaning because, unlike in the United States, it is linked to the dual
value principles of human dignity and the social welfare state.
Inevitably too, the language of duties-also underdeveloped in the
United States-joins the language of negative and positive rights. With
that joinder, communitarian relations and pressures join the propertybased contractarianism that prevails in our system. A community's
moral convictions must be recognized. Real autonomy, real individual
freedom is seen as requiring much more than the ultimate American
27. Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 ENIORY L.J. 837,
867 (1991).

28. Id. at 860.
29.

Id. at 861 n.69 (citing Wolfgang Zeidler, Grundrechte und Grundentscheidungen der

Verfassung im Widerstreit (Festvortrag anlidsslich des 53. Deutschen Juristentages in Berlin am
Dienstag, 16. Sept. 1980), at 4)). Even German law is double-edged, of course, and so it should be

noted that this paramount "principle of human dignity," particularly in the aftermath of Nazi
eugenics, was cited in 1975 to strike down a liberalized abortion statute. 39 BVcrfGE 1 (1975).
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virtue: choice."0 To stop with negative liberty, to rest content with resource-based choice by atomistic individuals is, in the German and
other social-democratic regimes, to misunderstand and underestimate
personhood. The German Supreme Court has explicitly held that
The concept of man in the Basic Law [Constitution] is not
that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law
has decided in favor of a relationship between individual and
community in the sense of a person's dependence on the commitment to the community, without infringing upon a person's
individual value.3 1
One might ask Glendon just how much difference does the law
really make anyway? Of course, the law is hortatory and may educate
and, as many social philosophers from Rousseau to Martin Luther
King have insisted, it may educate profoundly. In this sense, the first
premise of Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change?32 is mistaken: even if law were mere ideology,
ideology is both a terrain and a weapon in social struggle. "How many
divisions does the Pope have?" is simply not the right question to ask
about a Pope. Though "the word" is not in and of itself power, and
ideology does not vanquish the enemy, like flags, no war or insurrection
or even reform movement can do without ideological struggle, which in
our society intimately involves the courts and the language of rights.
But, with all due respect to Glendon and the Communitarian persuasion as a whole, one must wonder whether law can create community where it never existed or no longer exists. As Marx pointed out
long ago, and as social historians have demonstrated over and over,
class and community form around the "manifold relations" people sim30.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), probablyfaute de mleux, represents the apotheosis of

"choice." Indeed, defense of the principle enunciated there has become the pro-choice movement.
Of course, in material terms there is generally little "free" about the abortion choice. And Roe
itself posits autonomous, isolated women, alone and unattached to family or community (except
insofar as family and community might impinge on the autonomy and free choice of the woman
involved). There are no values that might transcend the woman's present interests bocause her
interest is presumed to be self-realization. As the U.S. Army recruiting ad puts it, "Be all that
you can be." Glendon herself has written a comparative study of abortion law. MARY ANN
GLENDON. ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). See Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL L REv 521 (1989).
31. 4 BVerfGE 7, 15-16 (1954).
32. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG. THE HoLLow HOPE CAN COURTs BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that, contrary to received wisdom, courts' impact on progressive social
change, especially racial justice, has been minimal). See also Jonathan Simon, 'The Long Walk
Home" to Politics,26 LAw & Soc'y REv. 923 (1992).
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ilarly situated may (or may not) form with each other."3 That law has
become our most pervasive common bond may be no more than sad
testimony to community's demise. Legal, ethnic, religious, geographical, sexual, gender-based, and other categories, no matter how oppressive, cannot provide the solidarity and community that make people act
together and for each other. American working-class solidarity, for example, was formed around the social sinews of working-class communities. Individual lives were embedded in "manifold relations"; those relations, once nurtured, maintained and to some degree imposed
community values in the face of opposing individual interests. That,
however, was before the relative demise of ethnicity (among white
workers), working-class neighborhoods and entertainments, intergenerational proximity, trade unions, political party machines, churches, and
public spaces, and before the rise of suburbs (home to twenty-three
percent of the population in 1950 and forty-six percent in 1990),34 lone
travel by auto, an unprecedentedly homogenous national culture, high
geographical mobility, self-help culture, and privatized home entertainment. The kind of willing coercion so difficult for rights advocates to
accept was, in fact, at one time both commonplace and embraced as a
source of solidarity.
Some types of law, labor law for example, tried to channel community without either destroying such "manifold relations" or elevating
them to official status. These laws were not about individual rights but
about collective empowerment that might require some subordination
of individual autonomy.3 5 They fostered solidarity through facilitating
institutions that mediated between individual and community: family,
class, party, and church were among the collectivities that made today's radical individualism less relevant and less appealing. By so doing, American labor law used to do what the European law still does:
foster community and what Habermas might call "participation competency" among union members.3
33. See RUSSELL HARDIN. COLLECTIVE ACTION 228
BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE 123 (1963) (based on

(1982); KARL
2d ed. 1869).

MARX. THE EIGHTEENTH

34. See Dianne Crispell, Myths of the 1950s, 13 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1992, at 38, 41.
35. See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1268 (1988).' Glendon somewhat underestimates the political and economic
basis for the assault on labor solidarity. See, e.g., id. at 1319-21; TOM FERGUSON & JOEL
ROGERS. RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLIT-

iCS 78-113 (1986).
36. See JORGEN

HABERMAS.
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Notwithstanding Glendon's hopes and those of sociologists like
Robert Bellah or Amitai Etzioni, upon whose work Glendon greatly
relies, there just is not much community left in the United States to
build on. The extended dying of our public school system, brought
home most recently by the president of Yale University departing for
the profit-making sector, and the withering away of our public libraries
only represent more nails in the coffin. To the extent that "community"
now exists, it probably supports just those property-based, rightsoriented, individualistic values Glendon aptly decries. Our Gemeinschaft-our community of values, history, tradition, language, and culture-to the extent that it actually exists, pushes Gesellschaft-mere
society-as a way of life.
In other words, the source of our values may be just what Glendon
says: community. But the content may be the dreaded atomistic individualism. In the interaction between self and community, between self
and fellow citizens, it is self-realization, personal autonomy, and individual choice that emerge triumphant. If we want to be engaged in
civic, communal, or political life, that is just one more choice. Our
rights therefore are again trumps, meant to stop other people. Is it
enough, or even possible, in a society that so values individual choice to
be true to our collective-communal selves, or to treat rights as public
rather than individual endowments? 37
The dilemma of anti-solidarity is what makes rights talk appealing. Because rights can claim a certain universality in a liberal society,
it has been argued that engaging in rights talk politics "across the spectrum of oppressions" can lead to the forging of a chain and the linking
together of various struggles against oppression into a politics that
transforms society itself.3 8 In addition, public interest groups of various
sorts, and minority and feminist civil rights advocates in particular,
have argued that rights talk and rights litigation can act as a spur to
organization and political engagement. Of course, it can be argued to
the contrary that the expert and technocratic framework of rights litigation strategies lessens rather than enhances the involvement of ordinary citizens.
37. See MICHAEL WVALZER. INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 23-30 (1987). As one
analyst has expressed the communitarian position, "rights are public and not private property.
having their source in the political community and not the individuals who comprise it. They are
constitutive of the community's public morality." Gardbaum, supra note 26, at 758.
38.

JOEL F. HANDLER. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEtS

A TihEORY OF LAW

(1978); MICHAEL MCCANN. TAKING REFORM
Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements, 17 J.L & Soc. 309 (1990).
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Glendon alternately ignores or rejects the view that America has
no significant and tenable shared values such as could make possible
getting rid of the rights talk model. She apparently believes in community as both source and content of our values. But what if there is no
broadly recognized interpretive community to provide even limited or
bounded objectivity to our lives? Or what if there are too many communities and hence no possible standards for behavior? Then lifestyle
choices must, by right, fill the decayed worlds of the poor and the
deconstructed worlds of the middle classes. Who then may complain
about either a Robert Mapplethorpe or a 2 Live Crew? There is nothing shared and no one in whose name coercive power could be legitimately exercised.
In a society where almost everything is, as Glendon shows, both
absolutized and contested as a right-instrumental for the sake of individuals-are there even any common meanings of substance to refine
and implement on behalf of political community? If we cannot identify
values universal in the polity or society, can we expect a functioning
political community or even widely authoritative rules? If we do not
have many shared values, what can we really expect of our politics?
The strange coalitions that formed over the flag-burning issue betray
how strongly we fear majoritarian oppression of individual freedom and
that, however dysfunctional, even the central symbol of the community
and nation must submit to individual freedom. 39
What we can expect is, in fact, what Glendon shows us we get: a
society in which the "right thing" is "your own thing." Our ethos does
turn out to be that of the John Stuart Mill-minus the elitism of the
clerisy: "Be all that you can be" while pluralism and tolerance function
as the guarantors of fairness. Only the pluralism is fully individualized
and out of control, while the tolerance is increasingly corrosive and insincere. Our avowed concern with respecting the values, identities and
"lifestyles" of others masks our private right to mock and deride.
Rather than arguing over what our collective values ought to be, we
simply agree to have none while pretending to respect all.
Because we have almost no enforceable collective values to generate community, rights talk can generate and build subcommunities in a
manner its opponents, including Glendon, fail to appreciate fully. Over
the past thirty years especially, rights have been advocated by social
39. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
joined by Scalia and Kennedy for the majority).
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movements pursuing causes whose goal is to validate various specific
identities or group cultures-race, gender, sexual orientation, age,
handicap, family status, and reproductive/fetal status, for example-mostly in the private sphere, rather than common interests or collective solidarities in the political arena. In this sense, rights talk reflects and encourages the liberal tendency to individualize, separate and
isolate issues, groups, and their members from each other.4 0
From the perspective of core social change, rights talk stymies
overarching interconnectedness, while advancing pluralism and even
fragmentation. It is difficult to get to the heart of things. Indeed, rights
talk encourages the notion that there is no essence to social relations.
All oppression, all deprivation of a putative right looks the same, is
equally absolute, and is equally unacceptable. Further, as in the law of
thermodynamics, every right produces a separate, equal, and opposite
right-the most prominent current example being a woman's right to
abortion and a fetus's right to life, neither of which existed before or
can exist without the other.
Given her severe and persuasive analysis, Glendon's recommendations are somewhat pallid.4 1 Like many Communitarians, Glendon is
wary of government as a threat to civil society, but at the same time
her analysis demands that we, like the Germans or French, have more
of it. It seems that Glendon fears excessive mention of the power of big
business and big property in the United States-and the plausible use
of government to temper it-lest communitarian hopes quickly be
dashed by the class strife of real civil society displacing a pre-imagined
harmony. Thus, Glendon rejects a "second bill of rights," like that
hinted at by FDR in 1944, as a way of constitutionalizing social policy.
Instead, she stakes out a position closer to that of the 1992 Clinton
40. See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & Pun. Avr. 107
(1976); Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, The Politics of Rights, I Soc, & LEGAL STUD 45
(1992).
41. She believes, for example, that "improved social welfare services require increased appropriations or more efficient use of resources, and more imaginative recourse to nongovernmcntal
groups, as well as such intangibles as leadership, dedication to public service, good employee morale, and citizen cooperation." GLENDON, supra note 9, at 98. This is all surely true but hardly
demands the keen analysis Glendon actually offers. The same may be said for her recommendations that we retreat from a no fault/no responsibility divorce regime, that "children [be put] at
the center of our family policy," that local government, religious, and other voluntary associations
be accorded more room, that lawyers and judges be more aware of their "radiating pedagogical
effects" and not foster irresponsibility, that plant-closing legislation be more community oriented.
that we encourage community action over government or market-based alternatives, that political
parties show more vigor, etc. Id. at 106, 111-12, 123, 126. 140-41, 175, 179.
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campaign and presidency, stressing moderation and compromise-unexceptional and perhaps uninspiring but certainly correct:
Modern liberal polities, in order to live up to their own professed ideals, require not only a citizenry that is prepared to
accept some responsibility for the less fortunate, but citizens
who are willing, so far as is possible, to take responsibility for
themselves and their dependents.42
It may be impossible for the gigantic, ethnically diverse, racially
riven, multicultural-yet-insular United States to emulate smaller, more
homogenous, and less market-based societies. Our social ecology is too
unstable. Likewise, it may be impossible to recreate community as either the WPA artists of the New Deal or Norman Rockwell knew
it-let alone as Durkheimian solidarisme or recent East European dissidents (both of which Glendon admires) imagined civil society to be in
the West. But there are, of course, some things we can do to foster
community, reciprocal reliance, and "manifold relations" in society.
It seems to me that civic duty, personal responsibility, and social
equity might well be served through certain specific, albeit controversial proposals: instituting universal compulsory national service such as
the draft (as urged by some Communitarians) would be a fine start. A
revivified public vocational educational system linked to annual industry norms for accepting and training apprentices along the German
model would be another realistic and positive move. Rather than "transcend the state-market framework" as Glendon would like, most necessary reforms are impossible without an active state role as well as "creative uses of the structures of civil society."'4 3
Ultimately, Glendon's evocation of community values to define and
limit rights and responsibilities must be transcended by a call for more
democratic and positive rights and obligations. So long as the rights
Americans are always talking about and claiming are negative liberties,
Marx's critique will remain fundamentally valid. Only with the abandonment of the property basis of our rights and the elaboration and
fulfillment of the social requisites for effective citizenship will rights
talk be more than the self-vindication of individuals or separate groups.
The negative conception of rights based on property was brought
into the world by a market-based view of society where, governed by
neutral rules, left alone by the state, and not discriminated against for
42.
43.

Id. at 105.
Id. at 141.
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suspect reasons, people would develop their free and autonomous individuality. Nowhere has this been truer than in the United States. From
Kant 4 and Faust to Rawls and Madonna, we have known that autonomous individuality is best achieved by those whose material needs have
been secured. Negative freedom cannot secure those needs. Negative
liberty, which our legal regime and our rights talk are about, is good if
you have cash. Courts can do little to turn the negative into the positfive. That is the task of mass politics.
Only if and when we overcome and transcend the grounding of
rights in property can moral and political values-separated by liberalism and rights talk-conceivably be brought back together. Only
then will a successful integration of Americans into roughly one democratic, moral-political, and interpretive community be possible. And
only then-maybe-will the cherished civic republican and communitarian virtues of participation as competent citizens in constructing the
common good life be feasible and worthwhile. It was, after all, the realization that the alienation of individuals from the community was the
fruit of the exploitation of particular social groups in a sharply divided
civil society that took Marx beyond communitarianism and which supported Isaiah Berlin's emphasis on positive liberty to accompany the
negative.
Until our politicians and social theorists, including the Communitarians, show themselves able to deal seriously with the realities of
class division and incapacitation, we can only expect citizen apathy and
incompetence to worsen. An "inert people" cannot take part in "public
justification, communication, and deliberation."" In the meantime, we
also need to remember what Eric Hobsbawm pointed out a decade ago,
namely, that wide-ranging rights claims "are not ends in themselves,
but broad aspirations which can be realized only through complex and
changing social strategies, on which they throw no specific light."' 4"
Those ends too are the task of mass polities?4
44. For Glendon, as for other non-philosopher citizens, goals, values, and priorities are at issue, and their philosophical justifications really do matter. Cf. Richard Rorty, Postmodernist
Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL 583, 583-87 (1983). As Glendon so persuasively shows, the
negative rights habits, values, and institutidns we have developed may be our problem as well as
our salvation, and there is far less reason to applaud than Rorty tends to furnish.
45. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
46. ERIc HOBSBAWM. WORKERS: WORLDS OF LABOR 310 (1984).
47. For an insightful and persuasive discussion of a "deliberative view or social rationality"
that locates both rights and community in a plausible and realistic portrayal of civil society, see

Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy, 6 Soc PHIL & POLY, Spring
1989, at 25.

